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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTINE E. ANDRTTS,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 10282

IDA ALLRED,

Defendant 1rnd Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
8TATE_\iEl'JT OF

~I1HE

NATURE OF THE CASE

'l1his is an adi on for personal injuries arising out
of an autornouil<' aceident wherein plaintiff, a passenger,
f P 11 out of defendant's car 1\·hich started to roll forward
after defendant had gotten out and as plaintiff was pre1)aring to aljght therefrom.

DlSPOSl 1l1ION" IN LOvVER COURT
At the pr<:>-hial conference both parties made motions for a ~'umrnary judgnwnt. Plaintiff's motion for
s1m1rnnr.\· judgme11t was granted and defendant's denied.
De£'t,rnlnnt appeals from the trial court's order and judgment.
1

RELIEF SOL'UilT ON APPE.:c\l.
Defendant seeks revenml of the sunnnary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff and judg1mmt in her favor as a
matter of law.
STATE~lENrr

OF rrHE FACTS

The following facts which are undisputed are disclosed by the published deposition of the plaintiff and the
answers to interrogatories filed by the defendant.
Plaintiff resides at -!-!81 8outh 9th East, Salt Lake
City, Utah. (Deposition H. 32, page 3.) She and the
defendant, Ida Allred, have know11 l·ach other for many
years. Mrs. Allred's daughter married l\lrs. Andrus' son
over 18 years ago. (Deposition, (R. 5~) page 5.)
On February 8, 19G-! at about 'i' :30 P.111. l\lrs. Allred,
the defendant, called at the plaintiff's home to make a
social visit. Defendant invited plaintiff to go with her
to Harman's Cafe at 39th South and State Street for
dinner. Each paid for her own dinner and Mrs. Andrus
did not pay anything for the ride. She was riding as a
guest in the car. (Ans\n,rs to interrogatories, .Nos. 4
and 5, (R. 8), Deposition, (R. 52), Pages 5 and Li.)
The plaintiff and defendant went to Harman's Cafe
in the defendant's 1950 Cadillac which was equipped with
an automatic transmission. After they had eaten they
then returned to plaintiff's home, it then being about 9 :30
P.M. Defendant brought the car to a stop directly in
front of plaintiff's home at the gate where the sidewalk
leads into her front porch. (Answers to interrogatories,
Nos. 3 and 9) (R. 8, 9
2

a1iplir·(l her foot to the foot brake, left the motor
nuii1 ing and tJ1onglit sh<~ Jiad pulled up the emergency
hrake, hut rna:1T not have pulled it on full. The car was
left in driVl' g~·~u. (Answers to interrngatories, Nos. 6, 7
and 8) ( H. 8, 9)
Si1(~

'The ('ar was fating north and standing on a wide
grayel shoulder. _;-\] u part of the car was on the hard surfac1c'. The gl'avel shoulder ~was (1uite level. (R. 52) (Deposition, pages 8 and 9)

After talking for a fow minutes the defendant got
out of the car 011 tlw drivl'1·'~; side to go around on the
passenger's side of the car to assist the plaintiff out of
tlrn car, although ll1is had not been her habit on previous
occasjons. (A11s\n~rn to interrogatories, No. 10) (R. 9)
As she started arnund the back of the car she heard the
plaintiff holler that the car was rolling. She ran back
to get in foe left side of the ('ar to stop it but did not
get under tlie wheel of the car until it about came to a
stop. By that time the plaintiff had fallen out of the car
and wa::i lying on the grnund in an injured condition.

'l1lie plaintiff opened the door to get out and as she
did so the car started to roll forward, while she was still
sitting on the seat. Reference is made to her deposition
for her °''·Tn account. (TI. 52) Page 7, Line 17 to Page 8,
Line 9.

''Q.

Now, were you inside the car when it started
to roll Z

A.

Y (_•s, partly. I was partly inside of the car
when j t started to roll.
3

Q.

N o'lv, which part of you was inside, and which
part was out 1
A. This side; my left side.

Q. Your left side was in?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. vVas your right foot outside 7
A. No. My left foot was inside of the car.
Q. Yes, and how about your right foot 7
A. Well, it was outside. It was on theQ. Had it touched the ground 7
A. I can't remember that.
Q. You justA. Just on foot, there.
Q. It was just hanging out the door, kind of,
was it 7
A. Yes, it was.
Q. I see. And then the car started to roll forward, did it?
A. It started to roll, just started rolling. That's
all.
Q. To the north, started to roll to the north 7
A. Yes. * * *
Q. How far did the car roll before you were
thrown out, do you suppose 7
A. About forty feet, I think."
Page 9, Lines 18 to 20.
"Q. Now you opened the door yourself to the
car did you¥
A. Yes. I opened the door myself and was starting to get out when the ca"r started to roll."
4

Pag·e 11, Liw•s 1 to '.20.

··<r
A.

(~.

A.

(~.

A.

N(Jw, wl1c·n tlit· <'ar started forward, then, you
still sitting down on the seat, were you1
Yt>s. Yes, I \\·as. I was sitting sideways on
tht· seat. ·was just going to get out, and I had
a hold of the door with this hand.
\\('l'P

\VhieJi way wen• you facing? Towards the
front of tlw c-ar, or towards the door1
\Vell, was facing that way. I must have been
faei11g that way to be a hold of the door,
wouldn't 11
\Vell, l dun't know. You could reach out to the
side and opt>n it. Do you recall which way you
wt~n~ facing when you opened the door1
\Vdl, I \vm; facing to the east when I opened
the door, sure.

Q.
A.

All right. But yon were sitting on the seat?
Yes, I was.

Q.

And you sa:· :·ou rolled about forty feet befon'. you fell out?
\Yell, tlw car did. I don't know how many
fed it was when I was throwed out."

A.

111 smrnnary, the plaintiff's testimony is that she took
hold of tlw cloor handlP, opened the door turning sideways
in tlH' St'at to get out, and that she still had hold of
the door hand],. as the car started rolling forward. Her
left foot she says was iu the car and her right was hanging ont the door. Slw finally lost her balance and fell
out tlH· right sidP of the car after traveling about 40 feet.
ri1 here is no evidence to the contrary.
Thne \'.·as r:o evi<lP1w~· of intoxieation or wilful miseondnet arnl the qltl'st ion is whetlwr, under these facts,
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the plaintiff was or was not, at the time of the accident,
a guest within the meaning of the Gtah guest statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT THE PLAINTIFF WAS STILL A GUEST IN THE
DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE.

Utah's Guest Statute, Section 41-9-1, U.C.A. 1953
provides as follows :
"Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in
any vehiclP, moying upon any of the public highways of the state of Utah, and while so riding
as such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall
have no right of recovery against the owner or
driver or person responsible for the operation of
such vehicle.***"
Section 41-9-2 provides:
"Guest defined. For the purpose of this section the term 'guest' is hereby defined as being
a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without
giving compensation then•for."
Street or Highway defined, Section 41-1-1 (bb)
"The entire width between property lines of
every way or place of whatever nature when any
part thereof is open to the public, as a matter of
right, for purposes of vehicular traffic."
rrhe purposes of various legislatures in enacting
guest statutes have been set forth in many cases. A few
of these purposes are herein set forth as follows : To deny
recovery for negligence against one transporting in his

6

<,;- his family, a Ro<'ial guest or a
ca:-;ual imii1·(·, man adion brought by the recipient of
his ho:-;1;it<1Lt:,, Jl_rnz_ie c. 8011dcrs, Calif., 1-±3 P(2) 70-t;
to i1revent mw \1-ho tnlY('lPcl with another in an automobile as a guest, or ,,-ithout compensation, from recovPring unk•ss it was proven that the driver was guilty
of gross 11eglig<·nce or wilful and wanton misconduct,
J11hos.: r. Ba;-to11, Fla., 1 80. (2) -±7G.
aLtto11ioliil1' a ttwutlln

Jn the ease of' J c11sc11 1. M uwer, -±Utah (2) 336, our
<~ourt has statvd iis <1pinion:
"'l1 liat in tlw adoption of this statute the
legislature sought to rPliPve the hardship which
is visited upon a generous driver who is sued by
an i11vit<·<l rider for onlinary nPgligence of the
driwr wlwn the rider gave nothing to compensat<' the driver for the transportation."

Lt has h(~en held that, being in dt>rogation of common
law, such statutPs are to be construed strictly. Calif.,
Pra9er r. Israel, 9S P. (2) 729. On the other hand, it
ha:-; ahio bcPn held that the gm'st statutes should be liberally co:ru;trued to eff ectuatP their purpose. Iowa, Nielsen
v. Kohlslrcdt, ll7 ff\V (2) 900, Vol.-± Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobil<: Law and Practict>, Perm. Edition,
-~ '.2313, Page 363.

It is undisputed that defendant's vehicle was on the
shoulder of the highway and that the place where the
deft,ndant's vehiele stopped to allow the driver and pass<'nger to get out, as well as the shoulder along which the
veliieh~ rolled after defondant alighted from the vehicle,
\\'t'n' 01wn to ili<-' public as a matter of right for purposes
of vehicular traffic.
7

It is also undisputed that the plaintiff was still \\·ithin
th':: vehicle \Yhen it starteu to roll forward and fell out of
the vrlticl<' \\·hile it was in motion on such highway.

r:nw plaintiff, therefore, fall::.; \\·ithin the gue::.;t statute
trchnically ::.;peaking.
Plaintiff contend::.; and the trial court found that the
ride hau ended when the car stopped in front of the plaintiff's home, even though the plaintiff had not safely
alighted from the car, and that the car was not still moving on the highway ·within the meaning of the guest statute when the plaintiff was injured. (R 38)
At least 2() states have enacted guest statutes which
vary somewhat from ::.;tate to ::.;tate. JHost of them provide that no person transported by the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle a::.; hi::.; gue::.;t without payment for such
tran::.;portation shall be liable, etc., and make no mention
of while riding on a higlnvay.
Utah, :Nevada, 1'rxas, North Dakota and California
have statut<"'s s~milar to each other which provide that
any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle
moving upon a public highway (or being transported
upon a public highway) cannot recover unless the driver
is guilty of wilful or wanton conduct, etc.
Counsel has bern unable to find any case in which a
coart has gone as far as plaintiff asks this court to go in
holding that the guest relationship had terminated at the
time of plaintiff's injury. The case of Prager v. Israel,
1940, Calif. 98 P ( 2) 729, relied upon by plaintiff in sup-
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iH'rt of plai11td'l"s po,-.;ition 1~; distinguishable in that in

tlw 1>rag·(·1· c;l0c· tlH· plai11tifl' did havP one foot on the
grnu11d, ;Jl l1 <t ;t alld was not sitting on the seat. In our
<'<tse plaintiff \\as c0111 pldl·ly st•ated in the automobile
and no part of Jin l>()(ly touched the ground before the
ear started rolling. ln the Prager case the car had been
sto1Jped for se\Teral hour:::;. ln our case the motor was still
running and the uu had !wen stopped for only about five
rninutPs. TlH• ear was sl ill on a portion of the highway
ns<"d for n•gular trafli<' purposes. The plaintiff was still
1lefinitely within the automobile.
r:I 1 he qnesiion wJ1etJwr at the time of injury there has
been a t\·rmination of the host-guest relationship between
the driver of an autornohile and one ridng therein within
the meaning of a statute, (or of the rule established even
in the abseuee of statuk in some jurisdictions) holding
the driver of a motor vehick• liable for an injury to a
guc:::;t only in ca:::;e of gross or wilful negligence depends
upon the provisions of the statute (where there are statutes) and upon the facts involved in the particular cases.
No general rule can be stated governing the determination
of these questiom;. 14-6 ALR 682, Annotation.

In some cases a distinrtion as to whether or not one
was or is a guest within the meaning of the guest statute
depends upon whether the statute requires one to be in
or upon the vehicle at the time of the accident. In the
absence of statutt' tJH• same rule is often applied. (Although no so-called guest statute exists in l\lassachusetts,
it is there 1H·ld under their common law that an automoliile ho:-;t i:::; not liable for an injury to a guest in the absence· of gross negligence.)
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In th 2 case of Adams v. Baker, I\Iass., 1945, 59 NE
(~) 701, plaintiff, a gratuitous guest, fell while alighting
from the defendant's vehicle. As she stepped from the
ri(J'ht
Joor of the tar her right foot went into about a
b
three inch hole along the right edge of the highway. The
only question was whether tlu~ guest relationship had
tPnninated. The trial court held as a matter of law that
the guest relationship on these facts had not h~rminated.
rrhP Supreme Court on appeal stated:
"'l1hcre i,yas no error in the action of the
judge in allowing defendant's motion for directed
verdict. Upon the evidence the jury 1vould have
bee11 obliged to find that the plaintiff was partly
in or upon the cl<·frndant's vehicle at the time of
the accident, and that the gratuitous undertaking
had not been terminated. * '~ * The stopping of the
automobile and the departure of the plaintiff
therefrom were nece;3~u·y to the conclusion of the
gratui tious undertaking."
In the case of li,'skelnwn v. ·wilson, 1948, Ohio, 80
NE (2) 803, where defendant had transported plaintiff
to a social gatlu~1iag and before beginning on return
trip the plaintiff i,r,·ent into the car but alighted vi711en
defendant could not find her l;:eys and stepped a\vay
about 2 fed and foe vehicle, Yd1ik moving bacl~war<l,
struck the plaintiff, the plaintiff when injured was not
"in or 'Upon said motor i ehicle," and was not a "guest"
within the guest statute. Defendant contended plaintiff
was still a guest. rnie court said, ''To hold as defendant
contends would n~l1uire the elimination from the statute
of the wurds "iu or upon said motor -rchicle." (Italics
ours.)
0
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\E (:2) 1:_::;, tl!1• 1Jlain1if'I' \\<t8 ridiJ1g as a gnest in aveliicl<' t)1-i\'i·;1 !1.·· l11"· 1rn~ku1d I\ 110 \\·as <lriving as agent
of' his ratltc•J', UH· df'l'('J](lm1t i11 tlie adion. The plaintiff
sudd('nly djscov1·n·d that h«r imrse was missing and
tlu' driver stopp<'d tlw v<'hicle so that the plaintiff could
d1eelz and se(• if tlw pun;(• was in the vehicle. She opened
the door, got 11ut and seareltc•d for tl1e purne, but was unable to fjncl it. ~11<' had om· foot on tlw running board
and one on th1~ grnund and \ms preparing to close the
door whe11 the truck lureh<'d suddenly forward and
struck and injured th\'. plaiutiff. rJ'he question was
\\'hdht'l' or not tll<· plaintiff was sb11 a guest under the
eircurnstarn•(;s. The trial C'Ourt held as a matter of law
tliat the pbintiff was a g1wst a11d limited her right of
act ion to l'('( overy und<'r the grn:st statute. Plaintiff cited
in her ]Jl'id the ease of Prrtf;er v. Israel, the California
1
cast~. rl he eonrt rejected the n·asoning in the California
ease and stated that the primary purpose of statutory
construction is to asc<'rtain the intention of the legislature, not only from the language used, but also from the
reason and necessit~, for the ad, the evil sought to be
remedied and the object and purposes sought to be
oLtained Ly it. Citing casPs.
'l1he reasonillg of the court in aniving at its decision
is set forth herein as we fed that is helpful in the interpretation of our own guest statute.

"'11 hat there should be a difference between
tlie liability of a iw1·son who, out of the generosity
of lli8 heart, r0nders gratuitously some service to
his follow traveler over those rendering such
st•rvice for hire and barter, can hardly be ques-

11

tionrd. Thos(~ who are charitably inclined should
not be restrained by fear of the consequences of
their mvn charitable act and the recipients should
not be permitted to gain by the generosity of their
host. Undoubtedly the Legislature, in adopting
this act, was aware of the frequency of litigation in
which passengers, carried gratuitously in automobles. have sought the recovery of large sums for
injn~·ies all(~ged to have been due to negligent
operation, and when•, in the use of the automobile,
which is almost universaJ, generous drivers might
find themselves involved in litigation that often
turned npon questions of ordinary negligence. It
was evidently the intention of the Legislature not
only to correct t11is abuse hut to promote the best
inten~sts of the people in their relation to each
other.'
''A narrow or liju·ral inte.cpretation of the \Yords
'person riding in a motor vehicle as a guest, without payment for such ride,' limiting the dfect of
the statute to aecidents occuning 1vhen a guest
is seated in an automobile jn motion, would defeat
or at least impair, the purpose of the legislation.
To give fnll effect to the legislative intent a generous owner or driver must be protected at all times
that the relation of host and guest exists in connection with the free ride. The begmning and
end of that relation is not unlilrn the beginning and
end of the relation of carrier and passenger for
hire in a public conveyance. In the latter case the
relation begins with the attempt of the passenger
to enter the conveyance and ends when he has
alighted in safety ~n completion of the journey.
It is not interrupted or terminated by a temporary
absence from the convevance for a reasonable and
usual purpose. 10 Arn~ J ur., Carriers, page 33,
3~1, 54 and 56. So, the relation of host and guest
between automobile owner or driver and a passenger riding without payment or compensation
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att(·rnpts to <•nfrr the auto<>ml;:; onl.\ \\ IH·11 h(~ has safoly alighted
a( 1 lH· <'11d f1l· i lt1• J id(>. H(•re the ride had not ter1!li 11at< d. l'laintili' \\as i11jun~d bdore she reached
ltLT L1e~1 im1t ion Tlw stopping of the automobile
to p(·nHit J'urtlil'l' :-:(·arch for plaintiff's purse and
the ad of plaintiff in gdting out of the car to
mon· effedively rnak<> the search, were usual and
customary arts irn~idental to a normal courtesy to
plaintiff as defemlant's guest. ~he did not lose
her status as a guest."
iwp,111:-; \\J1<·11 tl1(' .i~w·st

111oh1 ii\ alld

Sedion
vicles:

~)-201

Ill. Anno. Statute, 1958, p(,nn. Ed., pro-

··No penwn riding in or upon a motor vehicle
* < * as a guest without payment for such ride
* * ~- shall have a causP of action for damage
against the driver or 01wrator of such vehicle unl<·~s such acci<lvnt shall have been caused by wilful an<l wanton rnil'.lconduet of the driver or operator. * * *"

In the case of Bandolph v. W el;u, Ill., 1963, 194 NE
(2) 118 in an adion by a gut>::st against the driver of a
vd1ide for injuries received as she was putting money in
a parking meter wlwn the host's car rolled forward and
injurPd her, the court held that she was not a guest within
the statute and that the "host-guest relationship within
the gtwst statute begins ·when the guest attempts to enter
the automobile and en<ls when he has safely alighted at
the end of the ride."
In the case of Fra11kl'11stein v. House, Calif., 1940,
107 P (:2) 6:2-±, ·wht'l"P an elderly woman accepted an in\'itation to ride a::; guest uf the owner of a ear and entered
the rar, bn t the owner abs en frd Ji imse If tPmporarily, and
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the car rolled down the hill earnsmg the woman to be
thrnwn tlic,1·efrom, the woman remained a guest at all
tunes until she was thro1rn to the street and couldn't
rt>cover on the owner's simple negligence. The conrt said,
"As long as a person without compensation to the driver
has entered a car upon the invitation of such driver and
rema:ns in the vehicle upon a highway during such ride,
he is a guest."
An annotation in 50 ALR (2) comml'ncing at Page
97·1 contains nnmerons cases 1vith a wide variety of facts
pertaining to guests injured after having alighted or
while alighting from the host's car. These cases all appear to be consistent with the decision urged upon fois
coart hy your appellant herein.
CONCLUSION
The facts of this case clearly bring the plaintiff within the purview of the Utah guest statute and there being
no wilful misconduct or intoxication involved the trial
court's decision granting plaintiff a summary judgment
should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of the
defendant.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI and
LA ~WRE~·-rCE L. SUMMERHAYS
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant arnd
Defendant
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